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Abstract 
 
Eugenio Lecaldano offers an important contribution to the tradition of italian liberal thought. In his book on 
bioethics he deals with the subject’s most relevant topics by taking a utilitarian perspective , which clearly 
demonstrates the influence of J.S. Mill’s philosophy. The indication of some significant analogies and distinction 
among different moral problems is one of the most interesting and useful aspects of Lecaldano’s work. 
 
 
 Bioetica. Le scelte morali (1) (Bioethics. The Moral Choices) by Eugenio Lecaldano is an 
important step forward in the philosophical liberal tradition in Italy, as well as a significant 
contribution to the current bioethical debate. I find relevant and important a considerable number 
of moral distinctions and analogies Lecaldano uses to explain different aspects of the bioethical 
debate (one of them, for example, regards the context of the debate about the freedom to 
procreate, where a considerable part of Lecaldano’s argumentation is based on the idea that there 
is no reason to attribute different requirements of moral responsibility to cases of natural 
procreation and cases of assisted procreation). 
Because I feel sympathetic to almost every aspect of Lecaldano’s thesis, I will not write in detail 
about the merits of the book. I’ll indicate some points where it seems to me that some further 
explanation might be of some help. 
The book deals with the leading bioethical topics in contemporary debate. At the beginning of 
the book, the author tries to explain why the topics he chooses are the relevant topics of bioethics 
and why on the other hand others (although relevant in themselves) have to be excluded from the 
debate. Lecaldano’s choice is to discuss the end of human life and the right to die, the freedom to 
procreate, embryo experimentation, genetic engineering and genetic integrity, and the right to a 
minimal medical support. Among the topics excluded there animal liberation and environment 
ethics. I must admit that I didn’t find any convincing reason for this choice, and I think that no 
explanation for it is really possible nor necessary. Why include in the ‘proper domain’ of 
bioethics the debate on genetic integrity, while at the same time exclude the problem of possible 
animal rights (for example their right to live or their right not to be tortured)? Etymology at least 
would suggest that the proper domain of bioethics - literally ‘the ethics of questions of life’ - is 
closer to the problem of the possible right to life of animals than to the problem of the right to 
genetic integrity. The latter, as shown by Bruce Ackerman, can be easily shown to be an aspect 
of a theory of justice which deals the right to choose a model of life (2). Perhaps analysing the 
etymological meaning of the word is not the best way : it might be better to look at bioethics as a 
science closely related to medical ethical issues. However, in this case a problem remains. Why 
is the problem of embryo experimentation relevant to the topic, whereas the problem of animal 
experimentation isn't? There seems to be a specific moral choice behind this decision, i.e. that 
human rights have a specific relevance compared to animal rights. However, this is a position 
open to criticism (accused as speciesism), and it is not a good strategy to limit a domain of 
discussion to a specific position within the domain.  
However, as I already said, I don’t find it really necessary for an author to explain his or her 
choice of topics (at least if one is not writing and encyclopedia), and therefore I don’t think that 
Lecaldano’s choice needs to be questioned nor explained. 
Before directly approaching bioethical problems, Lecaldano offers the reader a discussion of his 
moral epistemology (i.e. of his method of moral inquiry). Lecaldano does not accept what can be 
called 'the deductive approach’ to moral philosophy (he calls it ‘engineers approach’), i.e. the 
idea that moral conclusions on particular cases can be derived from a singular general moral 
principle (or from a limited number of them). The engineers model fails because it leads all 
discussions to highly controversial general principles and therefore it reduces the possibility of 
finding a common solution to practical problems.  
Lecaldano’s polemic is directed indeed not only towards approaches that are related to the 
acceptance of general moral principle (either common sense intuitions or some naturalistic 
statements related to empirical sciences), but also towards those philosophers who support the 
idea that there are some epistemological, linguistic or other general principles that can serve as a 
foundation for moral reasoning. In the latter case, Lecaldano is referring to a Kantian model. I 
suppose that two examples of this ethical fashion might be Richard Hare (although Lecaldano 
surprisingly mentions explicitly Hare only because of the utilitarian epilogue of his theory, while 
his sophisticated argumentation is neglected) and Alan Gewirth (3). Hare develops his moral 
system from an analysis of the logical properties of moral terms, while Gewirth thinks that a 
whole moral theory can be derived from a proper definition of ‘agent’ and from a series of 
insuing deductions. Lecaldano’s opinion is that it is not impossible to find solutions to current 
moral problems, but that the relation to general principles as those indicated by Gewirth and 
Hare renders this attempt more difficult (if not impossible). Lecaldano also refuses the 
coherentist approach to moral reasoning (as the one proposed by John Rawls and further 
developed by Norman Daniels (4)). The coherentist approach holds that we must find an 
equilibrium among general principles supported by theories and intuitions related to particular 
cases.  
Is the analysis of the logical properties of moral terms or the search for an equilibrium among 
moral beliefs of different levels really more difficult than the search for a solution to current 
moral problems? Surely, Hare’s and Gewirth’s attempts are not easy. Proof of this is some 
discussion of their proposals (5). Neither is the situation with the coherentist approach really 
easier. But is the attempt to resolve concrete moral cases easier? I have some doubts about the 
possibility of a positive answer (6). However, let’s see how Lecaldano’s argument proceeds.  
Lecaldano’s methodological proposal is to arrive at general criteria in an inductive manner, i.e. 
by extending to more general situations the results of the analysis of singular cases. The 
approach is fallibilistic, i.e. Lecaldano doesn’t think that the result of the analysis might be some 
conclusive or absolute principle. This kind of method consists in a process which manifests the 
capacity to make an ethical diagnosis, whose central aspect is the search for analogies between 
different situations and the analysis of the consequences of a solution. Lecaldano doesn’t refuse 
the acceptance of general and abstract principles, but these must never be considered as non 
revisable. When looking at the consequences of a solution, it is necessary not to forget which 
value is to be privileged (according to Lecaldano itis the flourishing of human persons, and 
therefore their capacity to become more autonomous and able to enjoy higher forms of life).  
I must admit that at this point Lecaldano's purpose ceases to be totally clear to me. Firstly, I’m 
not sure that I have understood correctly the differences between his proposal and the method of 
reflective equilibrium. In its narrow version, the method is based on the equilibrium of particular 
moral statements and more general principles. Let’s use an example. Let’s imagine that 
somebody accepts some general principles, for example a set of principles that protect basic 
human freedoms. These principles might be primary intuitions, or they may be derived from a 
more general belief. Let’s imagine that they are derived from a more general beliefs. Let’s 
imagine also that this set of beliefs is represented by an ideal of human flourishing which 
consists in the possibility to of enjoying life onhigher values. John Stuart Mill’s idea might be an 
example (7). According to Mill, there are higher and lower pleasures, and the ability to enjoy the 
former must be developed, i.e. a goal of morality is to lead people to have the capacity of 
enjoying them. This can be obtained only if we ensure people some basic liberties - personal and 
political liberties as well as those related to economic activities (8). In the model of reasoning 
here briefly represented, neither the principles protecting freedom, nor the statements on values 
need to be fixed and not revisable. A comparison with judgments related to particular cases 
(which can be used as an inductive foundation for some moral principles) can lead to revise 
something on the ‘theoretical’ side (9). We can even imagine, as Michael DePaul does, that the 
acknowledgment of particular cases might lead to a revision of the moral sensibility on the 
subject, and therefore to a radical revision of the ‘theoretical side’ (10). 
Now, what’s the difference between this proposal and the method proposed by Lecaldano? I 
must admit that I’m not sure I have found it. It seems to me that the difference is even more 
difficult to see when Lecaldano considers whether traditional moral principles are compatible 
with the contemporary situation (as for example Peter Singer (11) denies). It appears here that 
moral principles have a relevant role. Of course, it is possible for Lecaldano to say that they are 
still defeasible by the verification (or falsification) in relation to singular cases. But even this, by 
itself, does not appear to be a denial of the method of reflective equilibrium. This appears to be 
exactly the method of mutual adjustment supported by the Rawlsian proposal. Moreover, at this 
point it is not totally clear what aspect of Lecaldano’s proposal can help resolve problems related 
to current moral troubles, where the method of reflective equilibrium, as Lecaldano himself says, 
fails (because referring to controversial moral principles).  
In interpreting Lecaldano’s thesis I should perhaps refer to other parts of his book, those in 
which he underlines the utilitarian nature of his argumentation. In this case, the idea would be the 
following one. The ground of the argumentation is utilitarian. The best way to develop a 
utilitarian approach is to find some principles that are justified by empirical evidence and related 
to concrete situations. However, those principles are highly revisable, and they are surely not 
fixed once for ever. New evidence can make the revision of these principles the most reasonable 
choice. But if this is Lecaldano’s choice, I’m not sure I can see the difference between his 
approach and that of Richard Hare in Moral Thinking (12), where this author explains the origin 
of moral intuitions. Moral intuitions are moral principles that are justified on utilitarian grounds 
as those that - the world being as it usually is - will lead to the best utilitarian solution. These 
principles are surely revisable, because they are based on statistical reasoning and therefore the 
consideration of more particular cases, or the achievement of more political evidence can lead us 
to change them.  
Maybe Lecaldano could accept the analogy between his proposal and Hare’s in the aspect that 
regards the relation between moral principles, particular cases and utilitarianism, but he would 
certainly refuse Hare's metaethical foundation of the moral discussion. However, I don’t see the 
advantage of Lecaldano’s version. I don’t think that avoiding the problematic parts of a 
philosophical proposal is a good solution, even if these difficulties might lead to a possible 
failure. If it is true that Lecaldano’s proposal is similar to Hare’s in the aspects I have mentioned, 
he might still have to answer to the objections of those that do not accept utilitarianism (none of 
its versions) as a valid moral approach. (Hare at least tried to do this). If this interpretation of 
Lecaldano’s proposal is valid, he leaves unanswered the possible objections.  
It seems to me useful to look in detail at another aspect of Lecaldano’s proposal. This is the one 
regarding Lecaldano's idea on the proper attitude we should take towards moral principles in 
relation to their enforcement. One proposal is to enforce moral beliefs by law. Lecaldano refuses 
this proposal, and thinks that instead of considering moral principles as something that has to be 
enforced by law, we must consider them as criteria of moral responsibility. If moral principles 
are not enforced by law, this does not mean that they have no relevance, or that the field that they 
relate to is of low moral relevance. It is still possible to use the weapon of moral condemnation 
or approbation. Furthermore, Lecaldano wants to indicate that his solution is not related to moral 
relativism. He doesn’t claim that there is not one preferable moral vision. He only denies that 
moral principles can be taken as absolute and indefeasible.  
Well, I’m not sure it is so easy to deal with these issues. First of all, I’ll say something about the 
refusal to enforce moral principles by law, while taking them seriously (and supporting them by 
moral condemnation and approbation). Lecaldano thinks that his attitude is the most apt to 
ensure social stability. It is true - according to Lecaldano - that it is difficult to imagine that 
social stability might be ensured even without a recourse to some common moral attitudes. But it 
is true as well that social stability can’t be ensured if the moral principles are accepted only 
because of fear of punishment. Now, I agree that if the support of a moral system is exclusively 
based on the enforcement of law the result is not particularly appreciable. Furthermore, I think 
that enforcing moral principles that are not part of a common agreement would be a source of 
conflict rather than a source of stability (or overlapping consensus). On the other hand, it is an 
illusion to think that moral principles can survive without any ‘external’ support (support based 
on some kind of authority external to the agent). Lecaldano himself thinks that this support must 
rely in most cases on moral sanctions rather than on legal sanctions. The proper domain of law 
enforcement in relation to the field of morality is the one which consists in to harm to others 
(13). 
In my opinion, there is more need for the intervention of law than the last sentence intends if 
strictly interpreted. Leaving all the responsability for the preservation of moral motivation to 
some support other than legal institutions creates the danger of vagueness, which might be a 
source of moral confusion. Some enforcement by law (even if the sanctions are only simbolical) 
renders more clear and evident which moral principles are of social importance. In contrast to 
Lecaldano’s opinion this can’t be established by using Mill’s criterion of harm to other only. 
This is a difficult point: when do harm others ? Who do we mean by relevant others ?. This is an 
open question in bioethical debates, therefore it seems to me that it can hardly be the criterion for 
the important distinction now under discussion.  
A better solution would be to accept as a criterion the identification of the moral principles and 
values that are relevant for social cooperation (as for example the respect of the integrity of the 
members of the political community - including their autonomy -, the respect of the value of life, 
some minimal social solidarity, etc.). Of course, the solution in this case is to look for principles 
that really result from an overlapping consensus in the political society. This is the proper 
domain of enforcement by law. 
I don’t feel that it is of particular help to social stability to have people with a common 
possession of a moral motivation, if then they disagree on particular moral questions. Religious 
fundamentalism really is a source of moral motivation, but it is difficult to accept that 
fundamentalists (at least in pluralist societies) could for this reason be a factor of social stability. 
Therefore, my proposal is to identify the space of moral consensus relevant for social stability. 
This domain, as I already said, is the proper domain of enforcement by law. The space that will 
remain - what falls outside the overlapping consensus, which is nevertheless of moral relevance 
to some people - must be left to solutions of particular moral communities. Therefore, two 
domains must be distinguished. Firstly, a domain of ‘public’ morality (which is related to the 
whole political society), where some enforcement by law (even though most frequently 
represented by symbolic sanctions) is needed. Secondly, a domain of ‘particular’ moralities, that 
must be left to the choice of particular moral communities. The first domain is the proper field of 
enforcement by law, the second one is the field of moral sanctions, even though operative only 
within particular moral communities. Indeed it seems to me that Lecaldano is not distant from 
this proposal while discussing current problems. For example, when he discusses euthanasia he 
says that what has to be protected is mainly the freedom of one’s conscience, and that therefore 
the institutions must not privilege one of the particular existing moralities. This seems to be 
consistent with the scheme of two levels of morality (only one of which has to be enforced by 
law) I’m speaking of. In any case, perhaps some more detailed explanation of the scheme of 
Lecaldano’s approach to the problem of the enforcement of morality would be of some help to 
the reader.  
It might be useful to look in detail to some of Lecaldano’s discussions related to concrete cases 
in order to see how he actualy applies his methodological proposal. It seems to me for example 
that the discussion of the problem of euthanasia creates some difficulties in the application of 
Lecaldano’s methodological approach. Even though in the first chapter he has declared his 
intention of not complicating moral discussions with the appeal to general principles that are 
highly controversial, it seems nevertheless that the confrontation with general principles is 
inevitable and reappears in the discussion of particular problems. In the discussion of euthanasia 
Lecaldano shows correctly the consequences of his approach, an approach that relies on the idea 
that the goal that has to be realized is the increase of happiness and that happiness can be 
obtained by making people more free to develop creatively their personality (14). However, what 
still remains open is the confrontation with at least one great cultural tradition, the one that is 
based on the sanctity of life. In Lecaldano’s view the only kind of euthanasia that is acceptable is 
the voluntary one, while the non voluntary (that particular case of euthanasia in which the subject 
doesn’t have the possibility to express his will, for example because he does not possess the 
cognitive or emotional features requested) doesn’t seem to be compatible with the author's 
paradigm. On the other hand, the tradition of the sanctity of life, as Lecaldano himself admits, 
condemns every type of euthanasia. Every particular situation will therefore cause disagreement 
between the two general approaches and what the solution requires is precisely a form of 
agreement on some general principle. My proposal is - in order to avoid conflicts and to protect a 
stable cooperative political society -, to leave the choice to the persons involved (as individuals 
or as members of communities), and only one common moral statement must be safeguarded, the 
one that protects the principle of equal freedoms. This means that I separate, as I have already 
done in this paper, two levels of moral problems: one is the level of the public morality, the other 
one is the level of private choices. Again, it seems to me that Lecaldano accepts this distinction. 
But if this is true, it is also true that it might be useful if he separated more explicitly the two 
different question: the problem of the possibility of ensuring a common moral basis in view of 
the necessity of supporting a stable cooperation and of avoiding conflicts (foundation of a public 
morality), and the problem of developing particular moralities inside the political society 
(foundation of particular morality).  
But this separation is not always visible in Lecaldano’s book. Analysing in more detail the 
euthanasia case, for example, it clearly appears that on the one hand Lecaldano expresses his 
respect for the sanctity of life doctrine (15) (which confirms the idea that what Lecaldano is 
looking for is a form of public morality, in which there is a space for different - even contrasting 
- proposals), on the other hand he criticizes this doctrine as not correctly founded. Lecaldano 
objects that the grounds of this doctrine (the theory of double effect, and the distinction between 
ordinary and extraordinary means) are misleading. In particular, I think that the criticism of the 
first criterion relevant for the sanctity of life doctrine is problematic. The theory of double effect 
says that an action that leads to death can be sometimes accepted. For example, let’s imagine a 
case in which somebody needs such a strong injection of painkillers that this same injection is 
lethal. The doctrine of sanctity of life allows this action because death is not the primary effect, 
but only something that follows an intended and legitimate effect (the theory of double effect is 
actually more complicated, but these complications are not relevant for the present discussion). 
Lecaldano’s criticism is that this criterion cannot be accepted as a public one, because verifying 
the intentions is not empirically possible. Now, I obviously accept the idea that it is difficult to 
verify intentions. In the euthanasia case it can be extremely difficult. But the attribution of 
intentions is not something unusual for the evaluation in social practices or behaviors, for 
example in criminal law and in the course of trials. Frequently this distinction determines the 
gravity of a murder, and trials are based on the attribution of intentions. Therefore, this can’t be 
an argument against the doctrine of the double effect. It is an argument ad hoc. What seems to 
me problematic in the doctrine of the double effect is this: is somebody that deliberately chooses 
an action which he or she knows will lead to an effect really not responsible for it?. It seems to 
me that on this issue our intuitions are problematic. In my opinion, the theory of double effect is 
one of the most relevant cases of moral hypocrisies in the history of ethics, but I admit that this is 
for me only an intuition that I am not able to demonstrate, and I have never found a really 
convincing demonstration for it. The fact that there is not a clear argument against the theory of 
double effect shows that it can be excluded from the public domain only in an indirect way. 
However there is not a conclusive proof in its favour as well, and this is a reason for excluding it 
at least as a compulsory rule. Nonetheless it would be an expression of brutal power to impose it 
to all members of the political society. At the end of the day, Lecaldano’s conclusion and mine 
are identical: if somebody wants to consider the distinction that grounds the theory of double 
effect as relevant he must be free to do this; the same must be said for somebody that doesn’t. 
However, it seems to me that this conclusion requires the appeal to two different domains of 
morality, more than a direct criticism of the theory of double effect. A direct criticism represents 
a moral choice for comprehensive doctrines, as those refused by Rawls as foundations for public 
morality (16). In any case, the choice of a comprehensive doctrine as the foundation of public 
morality must rely in some sense on the idea that this doctrine comprises some absolute moral 
valid statements, and this doesn’t seem to be consistent with Lecaldano’s intention. Therefore, it 
seems to me it would be useful if he illustrated more explicitly (and maybe more consistently) 
the distinction of the two levels of morality.  
Lecaldano’s strategy shows some further problems when he admits that a recourse to some 
objective moral criterion is needed. It is the case of situations of euthanasia in which the 
individuals involved have never had the possibility of making a choice (because they were born 
without the cognitive features needed). An objective criterion is therefore needed in order to 
decide whether life should be terminater or not. Lecaldano refuses both the right of the parents to 
decide for their children, as well as the establishment of a set of undefeasible rules. He thinks 
that the best solution is to leave the decision to an ethical committee (to which the parents will 
participate): a confrontation between different moral views is thus safeguarded. I agree with 
Lecaldano’s idea that the choice should not be left to the parents’ will. However, I’m not sure 
that leaving the decision to an ethical committee is a more valid solution. Again, I think that the 
diversification of two levels of moral domain can be of some help. It could be a general rule of 
political society that nobody should have the right to cause (or forbid to avoid) sufferance to 
someone (the function of the committee would be to determine whether an actual case is an 
instance of this). Therefore, the parents shouldn't always have the right to decide about the future 
of their child. On one side there is a rule that constrains the decisions of the committees and 
which doesn’t seem to be controversial in an irresolvable way, and on the other side there is a 
minimal insurance of the interests of the subject involved in the decision. On the contrary, 
Lecaldano’s proposal leaves - in practice - the fate of the child to the distribution of power in 
particular situations.  
As I already said, I don’t find the methodological doubts I have indicated as decisive for the 
evaluation of Lecaldano’s book. Most of the time I’m only proposing some further clarification. 
Bioetica. Le scelte morali discusses a great number of relevant bioethical cases. If, as I hope, 
bioethics is going to become part of ethical curricula in Italian universities, Lecaldano’s book 
will be a useful instrument for all those who think that the liberal approach must be part of this 
curricula.  
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